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behavior by corporate managers in the corporate scandals of the last three years,
but focuses primarily on the question of why lawyers so often seemed willing to
engage in or ignore behavior that presumably violated their own personal moral
codes (whether religious or secular) as well as their professional role morality.
The article draws on Robert Jackall’s Moral Mazes (1988) for an answer derived
from the sociology of corporate bureaucracies. Jackall’s case studies of corporate
managers found that managers adhered to the moral “rules-in-use” developed in
their social setting to facilitate their own survival and success. These rules em-
phasized an ethos of unrelenting pragmatism, ﬂexibility and cynicism that placed
great weight on group loyalty. By adopting their social setting’s actual moral
rules-in-use, managers tended to bracket other moral considerations, removing
such considerations as a potential obstacle to illegal or immoral behavior. Apply-
ing Jackall’s concept of socially-deﬁned moral rules-in-use to corporate in-house
counsel and lawyers in large ﬁrms, the article concludes that the social settings in
which lawyers operate can produce a similar bracketing of moral concerns and,
evenmoreimportant, thetypeofprofessionalrolemoralitythatshouldcheckman-
agerialwrongdoing. ThepotentialimpactoftheSEC’snewprofessionalstandards
for lawyers is assessed pessimistically in light of this phenomenon.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission's  Standards  of  Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys
1 represent an attempt to solve a problem.  The problem is 
that  ethical  obligations,  state  law  and  self-interest  apparently  do  not  give 
lawyers sufficient incentives to report law violations by corporate managers "up 
the  ladder"  to  appropriate  decisionmakers  within  the  corporate  client,  or  to 
disclose illegality to regulators.  That problem is considered serious, because it 
is believed to have resulted in lawyers' at least passive complicity in managerial 
wrongdoing.    That  complicity  violated  lawyers'  fiduciary  obligation  to  their 
corporate  client  and  betrayed  their  public  trust  as  gatekeepers,  thereby 
contributing to the recent epidemic of corporate fraud and corporate governance 
failures.
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the problem (as just defined) is 
real and serious.  Let's assume further that the Standards will go some distance 
toward solving that problem (although how much distance is debatable).
2  It is 
difficult to predict the potential efficacy of a legal solution to such a problem, 
however, without understanding why the problem exists, how deeply rooted it is 
in  the  reality  of  corporate  and  professional  life  and  how  the  problem  fits 
structurally into its social context.  Only with a fuller understanding of its social 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks to David Luban 
and [TBA] for their comments on a draft of this paper.  Opinions and mistakes mine, not 
theirs.
1 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. 
Reg.  6295  (Feb.  6,  2003)  (to  be  codified  at  17  C.F.R.  pt.  205),  available  at
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (hereinafter referred to as the Standards).
2 The divergence of opinion about the usefulness of the Standards is reflected in the various 
contributions  to  this  symposium.    For  other  opinions  about  the  Standards,  see  generally 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 
U.  ST.  THOMAS  L.J.  (forthcoming  March  2004);  Stephen  M.  Bainbridge  &  Christina  M. 
Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, MICH. ST. UNIV. 
D.C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: 
Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public 
Corporations?,  34  ST.  MARY'S  L.J.  873  (2003);  John  C.  Coffee,  Jr.,  The  Attorney  As 
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & 
Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. 
REV.  1097  (2003);  Thomas  Lee  Hazen,  Administrative  Law  Controls  on  Administrative 
Practice – A Look At the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 
ADMIN. L. REV. (2003); Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes-Oxley – Has the 
Landscape  Changed?,  3  WYO.  L.  REV.  371  (2003). [ADD  WASHBURN  SYMPOSIUM 
ARTICLES.]3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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reality can we assess whether government intervention will succeed or produce 
perverse, distorted or insignificant results.  It is the thesis of this article that the 
problem of lawyer complicity, active or passive, in managerial wrongdoing may 
be  rooted  in  a  socially-determined  moral  obtuseness  shared  by  too  many 
corporate  managers  and  corporate  lawyers.    Their  moral  consciousness  (or 
unconsciousness) may be so deeply embedded in the social contexts in which 
managers  and  lawyers  operate  that  the  standards  may  have  only  a  marginal 
effect.  While legal intervention may be needed to counter the gravitational pull 
toward complicity that some lawyers' personal moral resources cannot resist, the 
social dynamics that created the pull are persistent, pervasive and adaptable.  
The  Standards  may  come  to  be  seen  as  just  another  set  of  rules  whose 
neutralization,  avoidance  or  manipulation  is  entirely  consistent  with  the 
prevailing organizational morality.
That possibility may give some basis for pessimism about the success of 
the Standards.  The moral maze in which some corporate lawyers and managers 
find  themselves  may  be  just  too  hard  to  escape.    Before  reaching  any 
conclusions, however, let alone pessimistic ones, we need to understand more, 
first, about the varieties of lawyerly complicity in managerial wrongdoing, and 
second, the social and moral universe from which such complicity emerges.
II.THE VARIETIES OF COMPLICITY
The  recent  scandals  have  shown  that  both  in-house  counsel  in  major 
corporations and outside attorneys in elite law firms have in fact contributed to 
wrongdoing by corporate managers, in some cases criminally.  It is not possible 
to determine with empirical precision how systemic such behavior is, but there 
has been enough of it in the highest reaches of corporate America and elite law 
firms to suggest that the problem is not a small one.  Lawyers' contributions to 
the series of corporate disasters that cascaded through the first years of this 
decade were significant.  Most disturbing, perhaps, has been the variety of ways 
in which lawyers involved themselves in wrongdoing.
A complete survey of all those varieties is not possible here, but a summary 
of the basic types will provide a sense of the dimensions of the problem:
1. Lawyers affirmatively and intentionally helped managers engage in self-
dealing and misappropriation of corporate assets by deceiving boards about the 
nature of the transactions, particularly failing to advise the board fully about the 
managers' conflict of interest.
3
3 The failures of senior in-house counsel at Tyco and Enron in this regard are well known.  
Regarding Tyco, see Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 
20 n.46 (2003).  Regarding Enron, see Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics 
and  Enron, 8 STAN.  J.  L.  BUS. &  FIN.  9,  15 (2003).    Vinson  &  Elkins,  Enron's  outside 
counsel, also has been charged with responsibility for this type of failure.  See Sargent, supra, 
at 20-21 (detailing Vinson & Elkins' shortcomings with Enron); Rhode & Paton, supra, at 19 
(same).  There is a question, however, as to whether the outside lawyers, including Vinson & 
Elkins, who advised Enron's board could have done anything to persuade the board that the 
self-dealing  transactions  they  approved  were  problematic.    That board  had  a considerable 
amount of information about the conflicts of interest and failed to do anything about them.  
Professors Fisch and Rosen have concluded that "the lawyers could have had little impact on 
corporate policy, absent explicit disclosure of an overt fraud."  Fisch & Rosen, supra note 2, 3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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2.  In  representing  corporations  before  regulatory  agencies,  lawyers 
deceived  the  agency  about  the  fraudulent  or  otherwise  illegal  nature  of 
corporate activities and statements.
4
3.  Lawyers  materially  participated  in  preparing  false  or  misleading 
disclosures in documents filed with the SEC and disseminated to the public, or 
stood by passively.
5
4. Law firms provided legal opinions on transactions which the law firm 
had a significant financial interest in promoting.
6
5.  In-house  counsel  encouraged  managers  or  employees  to  destroy 
information related to an investigation, or at least did not discourage them.
7
6. Lawyers failed to report "up the ladder" within the corporation when 
at 1119.  While it may be true that the Enron board may have been informed of the conflicts of 
interest, and failed in their own duty of monitoring, it is by no means clear that their failure 
absolves Vinson & Elkins or Enron's in-house counsel of responsibility.  Given their intimate 
knowledge of the full extent of the conflict, the immense profitability of the transactions for 
the insiders, the disproportionate allocation of risk to the corporation, and the lack of arms-
length negotiations, can the advice they gave the board be presumed to have been minimally 
competent?  Furthermore, the apparent approval of the transactions by a prestigious law firm 
may have lulled an already acquiescent board into even greater passivity, especially when 
confronted with very complex transactions.
4 See, for example, the behavior of Kirkland & Ellis in its representation of Spiegel, Inc. 
before  the  SEC,  as  described  in  Stephen  J.  Crimmins,  Independent  Examiner's  Report 
Concerning Spiegel, Inc. (Sept. 5, 2003) (hereinafter Crimmins Report) (on file with author).  
Kirkland & Ellis filed late notices with the SEC on behalf of Spiegel, stating that the company 
was not filing its periodic reports because it was "'not currently in compliance with its loan 
covenants and is currently working with its bank group to amend and replace its existing 
credit facilities,' and thus 'not in a position to issue financial statements. . .'," even though 
Kirkland & Ellis knew that "the real reason why Spiegel was not filing its periodic reports was 
that it did not want to disclose KPMG's going concern qualification and other material bad 
facts and circumstances threatening Spiegel's survival." Crimmins Report at 83-84.
5 With respect to Vinson & Elkins' active participation with Enron managers in the preparation 
of misleading disclosures, see Sargent, supra note 3, at 20 n.50 (citing William F. Powers, Jr., 
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of 
Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002) at 178-203 (on file with author)).  Regarding the allegedly active 
complicity  of  the  general  counsel  of  HBO  &  Co.  in  fraudulent  financial  disclosures,  see 
Sa r gent, supra note 3, at 21, n.50.  For criticism of the passivity of White & Case in the face 
of material non-disclosures by Spiegel managers, see Crimmins Report, supra note 4, at 82.
6 See Paul Braverman, The Bleeding Edge, AM. LAW., June 2003, at 94, 97 (detailing practice 
of providing tax opinions on very aggressive corporate tax shelters when opining law firm was 
actively involved with investment bankers in developing and promoting such transactions).  
Among  the  firms  involved  in  this  practice  were  McKee  Nelson  Ernst  &  Young,  King  & 
Spalding and Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.  See id.; Mike France, The Rise of the Wall 
Street Tax Machine, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 2003, at 84, 85-87.  For more detailed analysis of 
this  phenomenon,  see  STAFF  OF  SENATE  COMM.  ON  FIN.,  107TH  CONG.,  REPORT  OF 
INVESTIGATION  OF  ENRON  CORPORATION  AND  RELATED  ENTITIES  REGARDING  FEDERAL 
TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, (Comm. Print 2003), 
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/jcs-3-03/vol1/.
7 For  critical  discussion  of  the  role  of  Arthur  Andersen's  in-house  counsel  and  outside 
attorneys  (Davis  Polk  &  Wardwell)  in  the  destruction  of  documents  relating  to  its 
representation of Enron, see Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer 
on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 158-63.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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confronted with material violations of law by managers;
8
7.  Lawyers  failed  to  conduct  adequate  special  investigations  of  alleged 
managerial wrongdoing when specifically retained to do so, sometimes because 
of their own conflicts of interest.
9
Those are perhaps the principal types of illegal or immoral behavior that 
lawyers have facilitated or participated in, actively or passively, intentionally or 
negligently, enthusiastically or reluctantly.  But why did they do it?  There is no 
shortage of explanations.
III.SOME EXPLANATIONS
The explanations range from the grandiose to the technical.  For example:
Lawyers' wrongdoing simply reflected a general cultural moral decline.
Lawyers got tired of watching their clients make all the money through 
opportunistic behavior in the financial gold rush of the 90's, and decided to join 
in the fun.
Professional values succumbed to business values in large law firms, so 
lawyers became increasingly willing to do anything for money.
The  demise  of  client  loyalty  and  the  increasing  fragility  of  client 
relationships  required  law  firms  and  lawyers  to  be  more  "flexible"  about 
problematic transactions to preserve the client relationship.
A premium on generating a constant flow of deals and processing them 
rapidly led to inattention to detail, including potential conflicts, over-reliance on 
inexperienced lawyers, and a preoccupation with ensuring repeat business.
The demise of aiding and abetting liability for lawyers,
10 the impact of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on class actions,
11 and chronic 
SEC understaffing
12 contributed to a "Wild West" atmosphere in which the fear 
8 This may have been the primary failure by Enron's general counsel.  For discussion of his 
role, see Miriam Rozen, An Unenviable Position, TEX. LAW. Feb. 4, 2002, at 1.
9  For  critical  discussion  of  the  serious  conflicts  of  interest  that  compromised  a  special 
investigation of Global Crossing conducted by Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, see Report of the 
Special Committee on Accounting Matters to the Board of Directors of Global Crossing Ltd., 
Global  Crossing's  Response  to  Olofson's  Allegation  37-47  (Feb.  18,  2003)  (on  file  with 
author).  For additional sources discussing the Simpson Thacher investigation, see Sargent, 
supra note 3, at 28 n.77.  For critical discussion of Vinson & Elkins' well-known conflicts of 
interest in its perfunctory investigation of whistleblower allegations regarding massive insider 
self-dealing at Enron, see Cramton, supra note 7, at 162-67.
10 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994) (denying imposition of aiding and abetting liability).
11 [CITE]
12 For an argument that the SEC has not been equal to its regulatory responsibilities with 
respect to public corporations, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T. AFF., 107TH CONG., 3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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of liability was minimized.
The  growth  and  geographic  spread  of  large  law  firms  impeded  internal 
monitoring,  and  led  to  excessive  diffusion  of  responsibility  undermining 
individual  accountability,  and  resulted  in  proliferating  and  insufficiently 
monitored conflicts of interest.
Work  assigned  to  outside  law  firms  has  become  heavily 
compartmentalized,  so  that  lawyers  working  on  particular  transactions  and 
pieces of transactions may not have the global view or the authority that would 
allow them to detect or deal with wrongdoing.
[find general article discussing or alluding to above?]
All of the foregoing explanations for the involvement of lawyers with their 
clients' wrongdoing —or their failures to restrain that wrongdoing—have some 
force.    A  multiplicity  of  explanations  also  makes  sense  because  of  the 
circumstances and nature of the offenses and lawyers' contributions to them 
varied so much.  Different explanations apply with different force in the various 
contexts; seeking a monocausal explanation would seem to be futile.
IV.THE MORAL ORIGINS OF COMPLICITY
In describing the behavior of the lawyers and law firms in these cases, 
however,  there  does  seem  to  be  something  that  links  them  all:  an  apparent 
indifference  to  the  morality  of  their  actions.    Most  of  the  lawyers  involved 
presumably possessed some form of personal moral code, whether based on 
religious or secular premises, and a professional role-morality that should have 
been as stringent in its proper sphere as any personal morality.  Those personal 
and professional moral perspectives, at a minimum, would have insisted upon 
truth-telling, personal integrity, concern about the consequences of one's actions 
for others, recognition of the limitations on one's obligation to a client, and an 
understanding that the "legal" is not coextensive with the "moral."  Those moral 
priorities,  however,  often  seemed  to  disappear  into  a  smog  of  expediency, 
rationalization, willful blindness and slavish obedience to the wishes of self-
interested managers who purported to speak for the corporate client.  Of course, 
we  cannot  read  the  hearts  of  those  lawyers,  our  knowledge  of  the  facts  is 
incomplete, and hindsight judgment of others can be self-indulgent, but the facts 
speak  for  themselves:  many  lawyers  in  these  cases,  whether  actively  or 
passively, helped corporate managers act illegally or immorally or both.
It is sloppy and cheaply judgmental to talk about epidemics of greed or 
stupidity—although there was apparently plenty of both in these cases. It is also 
naive to talk about a fall from a golden age of corporate and lawyerly probity, 
although the opportunities for massive fraud and malfeasance seem to be getting 
greater.  Ultimately, narratives of cultural decline and a decadent zeitgeist are 
historically imprecise and sociologically crude, and of little explanatory use.  
There needs to be a more concrete explanation for why some lawyers' sense of 
FINANCIAL  OVERSIGHT  OF  ENRON:  THE  SEC  AND  PRIVATE  SECTOR  WATCHDOGS  29-68 
(Comm. Print 2002).3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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personal and professional moral boundaries seemed to be so insignificant in the 
way they worked with the corporate managers who did so much harm.
Perhaps  something  more  useful  can  be  found  by  looking  at  the  social 
situations in  which  these lawyers lived and acted.  What  was it about their 
rootedness in specific social contexts that influenced the way they thought about 
what is permissible and what is not, and which seems to have caused them to 
sideline or bracket the sense of limits they brought with them to the workplace 
from their personal, religious or professional moral formations?
A. The Moral World of Corporate Managers
Extraordinary insights into this question can be found in Robert Jackall's 
Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers,
13 published in 1988.  This 
book is an in-depth sociological analysis based on extensive fieldwork among 
corporate managers in several corporations in the chemical and textile industries 
in  the  early  1980s.    Jackall's  goal  was  to  examine  how  bureaucracy  shapes 
moral  consciousness.
14    His  premise  was  that  the  moral  consciousness  of 
corporate managers has to be understood not in terms of abstract philosophical, 
religious  or  professional  moral  systems,  but  "sociologically,  that  is,  as 
empirical,  objective  realities  to  be  investigated."
15    That  is  precisely  what 
Jackall attempts to do in Moral Mazes, identifying the actual moral "rules-in-
use"
16 that governed the way his corporate managers behaved in their social 
setting.  This highly concrete, empirical approach enabled Jackall to avoid the 
aridity and abstractness of most discussions of business or professional ethics, 
and to explain why managers "bracket, while at work, the moralities that they 
might hold outside the workplace or that they might adhere to privately and to 
follow  instead  the  prevailing  morality  of  their  particular  organizational 
situation."
17    Jackall  argues,  in  essence,  that  managers  tend  to  adhere  to  an 
occupational  morality  determined  by  the  social  structure  of  their 
workplace.[add  footnote  and  find  support]    If  one  wants  to  understand  why 
managers choose to act one way and not the other, including acting immorally 
and  illegally,  one  needs  to  understand  that  occupational  morality.    To 
understand that occupational morality, however, one must understand the social 
context in which it emerges.  In the large business corporation, he argues, the 
social context is bureaucratic.
Bureaucratic  work,  Jackall  argues,  shapes  people's  consciousness  in 
decisive  ways.    Much  of  the  way  it  does  so  is  familiar,  particularly  in  its 
rational/hierarchical characteristics.
It regularizes people's experiences of time and indeed routinizes their lives 
by  engaging  them  on  a  daily  basis  in  rational,  socially  approved, purposive 
13 ROBERT M. JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
14 See id. at 3 (stating purpose of author's study).
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 6.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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action; it brings them into daily proximity with and subordination to authority, 
creating in the process upward-looking stances that have decisive social and 
psychological  consequences;  it  places  a  premium  on  a  functionally  rational, 
pragmatic habit of mind that seeks specific goals . . . .
18
Other ways are perhaps less familiar.  We tend not to think of "impersonal"
bureaucracies as crucibles of intense personal competition, in which people are 
subjected to:
subtle  measures  of  prestige  and  an  elaborate  status  hierarchy  that,  in 
addition to fostering an intense competition for status, also makes the rules, 
procedures,  social  contexts,  and  protocol  of  an  organization  paramount 
psychological and behavioral guides.
19
It  is  in  the  context  of  this  deeply  personal  competition  for  status  in  a 
hierarchical system of power and domination that people learn to be guided by 
the rules that will promote their success.  A foundational rule is the imperative 
to bracket conventional morality within managerial circles, "where such verities 
are widely recognized to be inapplicable except as public relations stances."
20
Once those "verities" are bracketed, the organization's rules-in-use determine 
the decisions that individual managers make.[add endnote and find support]
It is not possible to do justice here to Jackall's thick description of the 
world of his corporate managers, or to the intricacies of its moral system, but 
some of its key characteristics can be summarized.  That world is characterized 
by:
Intense  competition  for  status  and  power,  with  people  constantly  pitted 
against each other.
21
A disconnection between hard work and success, based on the reality that 
hard work alone cannot produce success because ability to play the corporate 
"game" is also crucial.
22
A  disconnection  between  appearance  and  reality,  derived  from  the 
realization that the important decisions are made in back rooms; that the public 
reasons for decisions are often not the real reasons;
23 and that a willingness to 
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id. at 5-6.
20 [TBA]
21  As  Jackall  describes  the  situation:  "since  rewards  are  always  scarce,  bureaucracies 
necessarily pit people against each other and inevitably thwart the ambitions of some." Id. at 
35.  Jackall sees the competitive dynamic, however, as more than a competition for resources, 
but also as a type of psychological competition: "Even more important on a day-to-day basis 
is the ongoing competition between talented and aggressive people to see whose will prevails, 
who can get things done their way." Id.  The two types of competition, Jackall notes, are 
complementary: ability to impose one's will creates a credibility that facilitates competition 
for resources.
22 "[M]anagers see success depending principally on meeting social criteria established by the 
authority and political alignments – that is, by the fealty and alliance structure – and by the 
ethos and style of the corporation." Id. at 45.
23 This is so, Jackall argues, even though one of the hallmarks of a bureaucracy is the written 
record:
[E]ven where one can follow a paper trail, most written documents in the corporate world 
constitute simply official versions of reality that often bear little resemblance to the tangled, 
ambiguous, and verbally negotiated transactions that they purportedly represent.  As a result, 3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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sustain that disconnection is crucial to personal advancement.
An almost feudal system of personal loyalty and fealty between supervisors 
and inferiors, in which personal fates are interconnected,
24 and group loyalties 
are of paramount importance.
25
An  enormous  premium  on  "flexibility"  and  willingness  to  adapt  to 
expediency rapidly.
26
An optimistic belief that problems of questionable legality or morality can 
be  "outrun"  before  the  consequences  come  to  roost  and  hence,  need  not  be 
confronted.
27
A pervasive sense of social uncertainty, in which one is constantly aware of 
being  evaluated,  but  in  a  system  that  is  capricious  and  in  which  all  status 
arrangements are contingent and fluid.
28
In  such  a  world,  a  distinctive  set  of  moral  rules-in-use  emerges;  one 
adapted  to  the  social  intricacies  of  the  organization.  Those  rules  can  be 
characterized as follows:
whatever meaningful tracking does take place occurs within managers' cognitive maps of their 
world, which, of course, are constantly changing and subject to retrospective interpretation 
and reinterpretation.
Id. at 88.  Jackall also found that within his corporate bureaucracies rational decision-making 
processes  were  not  always  followed,  and  that  impulsiveness  and  irrationality  were  not 
infrequent, but that such behavior was "always justified in rational and reasonable terms.  It is 
so  commonplace  in  the  corporate  world  that  many  managers  expect  whatever  ordered 
processes they  do  erect to be subverted  or overturned by  executive fiat masquerading, of 
course, as an established bureaucratic procedure or considered judgment." Id. at 77.
24 See Jackall, supra note 13, at 17 ("Managers do not see or experience authority in any 
abstract  way;  instead  authority  is  embodied  in  their  personal  relationships  with  their 
immediate bosses and in their perception of similar links between other managers up and 
down  the  hierarchy.").  Jackall  describes  the  management  style  he  observed  as  shaping  a 
"patrimonial authority arrangement that is crucial to defining both the immediate experiences 
and the long-run career chances of individual managers.  In this world, a subordinate owes 
fealty  principally  to  his  immediate  boss."  See  id.  at  19.    In  describing  expensive  and 
apparently  irrational  gestures  of  fealty  to  the  CEO,  Jackall  explains  that  "[i]t is far  more 
important to please the king today than to worry about the future economic state of one's fief, 
since, if one does not please the king, there may not be a fief to worry about or indeed vassals 
to do the worrying." Id. at 22.
25  See id.  at  25  (discussing  sharing  of  credit  for success  within  hierarchical subgroups in 
corporations).  The importance of group loyalty is underscored by Jackall's comparison of 
managerial circles in sociological terms to gangs. See id. at 39 (discussing social contexts that 
breed alliances).
26 See id. at 128-33 (discussing importance of flexibility and adaptability to expedience in 
order to maintain solidarity with managerial colleagues).
27 For a description of this attitude, as exemplified in the game  of "milking the plant" to 
generate short-term profits that make the plant manager look good, and long-term losses that 
are not realized until after the manager leaves (and which can be blamed on his successor), see 
id. at 96-100.
28  Jackall  describes  how  managers  have  an  acute  sense  of  organizational  contingency.  
Because of the interlocking ties between people, they know that a shake-up at or near the top 
of a hierarchy can trigger a widespread upheaval, bringing in its wake startling reversals of 
fortune,  good  and  bad,  throughout  the  structure."  Id.  at  33.  Compounding  the  sense  of 
uncertainty created by the "constant potential for social reversal," is an awareness of always 
being on probation, which, Jackall argues "produces a profound anxiety in managers, perhaps 
the key experience of managerial work." See id. at 33, 40.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
2004] LAWYERS IN THE MORAL MAZE 109
The prevailing ethos is remarkable for its lack of fixedness.  Decisions are 
governed  by  an  "essential,  pervasive  and  thoroughgoing  pragmatism,"
29  in 
which alertness to expediency is of paramount importance.
Questions  of  "right"  or  "wrong"  should  not  be  confronted  as  such;  an 
insistence  on  the  moral  dimensions  of  an  issue  is  regarded  as  at  best, 
embarrassing, and, at worst, fatally disloyal.
30
A willingness to keep silent about problems that may prove embarrassing 
to superiors or the organization is highly prized.
31
29 Id. at 105 ("[A] principal managerial virtue and, in fact, managers' most striking actual 
characteristic is an essential, pervasive, and thoroughgoing pragmatism.").
30 See id. at 101-05 for adiscussion of how "White," a specialized manager hired by a textile 
company to deal with the problem of damage to employees' hearing resulting from long-term 
exposure to the company's machinery, failed in his efforts to focus managers' attention to the 
problem, precisely because of his insistence on framing the problem as a moral one.
[T]hough  the  company  publicly  pointed  with  pride  to  its  employment  of  someone  with 
training in audiology, the fact is that White's moral squint on the issue, manifested by his 
obvious moral commitment to the problem and his insistence on the company's obligation to 
workers, made other managers uncomfortable.
Id.  at  104.  Jackall  shows  that  this  discomfort  reveals  something  fundamental  about  his 
managers' moral consciousness.
[W]hy should his moral stance make other managers uncomfortable?  Managers are, after all, 
men  and  women  with  exactly  the  same  kind  of  moral  sensibilities  that  White  possesses 
although they may express them in different arenas of their lives.  Here the political vagaries 
typical of corporations provide the clue to the riddle.  Without clear authoritative sanctions, 
moral viewpoints threaten others within an organization by making claims on them that might 
impede their ability to read the drift of social situations.  As a result, independent morally 
evaluative judgments get subordinated to the social intricacies of the bureaucratic workplace.  
Notions of  morality that one  might hold and indeed practice outside the workplace—say, 
some variant of Judeo-Christian ethics—become irrelevant, as do less specifically religious 
points  of  principle,  unless  they  mesh  with  organizational  ideologies.    Under  certain 
conditions, such notions may even become dangerous.  For the most part, then, they remain 
unarticulated  lest  one  risk  damaging  crucial  relationships  with  significant  individuals  or 
groups.  Managers know that in the organization right and wrong get decided by those with 
enough clout to make their views stick.
Id. at 105.
31 See id. at 31 (regarding secrecy as a pervasive corporate phenomenon).  See id. at 128-33 ( 
describingcase of "Tucker," a "lower middle-level manager" who discovered certain technical 
problems in fibers manufactured by his company that meant almost certain liability disaster).  
The manager dutifully reported up the ladder as quietly as possible:
What follows is a cautionary tale about the virtues of steadfast silence amidst the perils of 
corporate  life.    One  may  gauge  the  reactions  of  top  executives  to  Tucker's  report  from 
subsequent events.  All thirty copies of the report were confiscated.  Tucker was asked to 
surrender all of his working notes.  Tucker's desk was entered and his own copy of his report 
taken.  The carpet was never introduced; the tires were never introduced; the press conference 
was never held.  One executive, three levels above Tucker, was quietly fired; two research and 
development scientists, who apparently had been "fudging data" under pressure from the line, 
were also sanctioned, one fired, the other demoted.  And Tucker never heard about the matter 
again.  He says:
Now clearly the report got to someone because they stopped the introduction of the product.  
This was not a light decision because four years of work and a lot of hope had gone into it.  
There was real panic in the division about it.  But our evidence was irrefutable.  Yet no one 
ever told me thank you; no one ever said that I was a good employee.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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Fealty  to  superiors  within  the  organization  trumps  other  moral 
obligations.
32
Individual  responsibility  for  problems  or  mistakes  should  be  avoided; 
responsibility  should  be  diffused  as  much  as  possible;  dangerous  decisions 
should be avoided.
33
Legal  and  regulatory  requirements  should  be  regarded  cynically,  and 
compliance  should  be  conducted  in  a  manner  that  serves  the  interest  of  the 
individual manager in the competitive game.
34
The last remarks are not made in a complaining way.  Rather, Tucker understands that this 
lack of acknowledgment, this silence on the part of authorities, was, first, an implicit warning.
Now the key thing is that if I had pursued this issue I would have been fired, no doubt about it.  
Since I didn't pursue it, I didn't get any credit but I also didn't get fired.  I was the messenger 
that came to the king and told him that his son had been tortured to death and his ears cut off.  
One of the norms here is to keep quiet once you have done your job in reporting what you 
see. . . .If you pursue something like this, no one will like you.  It's that simple.
Tucker has risen steadily since that episode.  He  understands now  that the silence of his 
superiors also established the criterion for an implicit probation:I think that I've got to where I 
am today because of this. [His boss's boss] knows that I saved the company a lot of money 
and a lot of asses to boot.  And he and others know that I am someone who can be trusted.  I 
can keep my mouth shut. . .And that's the biggest thing that I have going for me—that people 
feel that I can be trusted.  I can't overemphasize that enough.
Id. at 130.
32 See Jackall's discussion of how a manager deeply troubled by blatantly illegal manipulation 
of the pension fund by his supervisors for their own benefit was summarily fired because he 
"could not just go along with things even if he did not agree." Id. at 109.  His termination was 
regarded as entirely appropriate by other managers:
His basic failing was . . . that he violated the fundamental rules of bureaucratic life.  These are 
usually stated briefly as a series of admonitions. (1) You never go around your boss. (2) You 
tell your boss what he wants to hear, even when your boss claims that he wants dissenting 
views. (3) If your boss wants something dropped, you drop it. (4) You are sensitive to your 
boss's wishes so that you anticipate what he wants; you don't force him, in other words, to act 
as boss. (5) Your job is not to report something that your boss does not want reported, but 
rather to cover it up.  You do what your job requires, and you keep your mouth shut.
Id.
33  The  tendency  toward  diffusion  of  responsibility  within  corporate  bureaucracies  is  very 
strong because of the intense competition among managers and the enormous contingency and 
fragility of status.  See id. at 85-90 (describing various aspects of corporate scapegoating).  
This leads, however, to the designation of "patsies" to be blamed for failure, regardless of the 
actual level of culpability:
The most feared situation is to end up inadvertently in the wrong place at the wrong time and 
get  blamed  [for failure  or  mistake].   Yet this  is  exactly  what  happens  in  a  structure  that 
systematically  diffuses  responsibility.    It  is  because  managers  fear  blame-time  that  they 
diffuse responsibility; however, such diffusion means that someone, somewhere is going to 
become a scapegoat when things go wrong.
Id. at 86.  The impact of this behavior on managers' sense of accountability was described 
graphically by one of Jackall's managers in the following terms:
The good manager is always aware and always wary.  He knows that he has to be able to point 
the finger at somebody when things go wrong.  There's no accountability in the corporation.  
People don't want to hear about that shit.  What you hope is that no one is after your ass . . . .
Id. at 89.
34 For a summary of managers' attitudes toward regulation and regulators, and of managers' 
need to overcome their challenges, see id. at 147-48.  For analysis of the ideological mind set 3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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Truth-telling is essentially optional, because "'truth' is socially defined, not 
absolute, [so] . . . that . . . compromise, about anything and everything, is not 
moral defeat . . . but simply an inevitable fact of organizational life."
35
It should be no surprise that Jackall identified several instances in which 
these rules-in-use prevented his corporate managers from coping honestly with 
instances of even blatant illegality, such as financial fraud perpetrated by the 
CEO.
36  In that case, loyalties to superiors and other group members, extreme 
sensitivity to short-term expediency, willingness to bury problems with silence 
and, most of all, preoccupation with status in the organization, led not just to 
sidelining  of  moral  concerns  but  to  complicity  in  substantial  wrongdoing.
37
Jackall's description of managers' willingness to engage in self-dealing
38 and 
manipulation of financial data, and to co-opt in-house lawyers into facilitating 
and hiding the fraud,
39 or to exclude them from knowledge of the facts,
40 is 
eerily prophetic of the widespread financial fraud at the highest levels of major 
corporations that surfaced so dramatically in recent years.
While  Jackall's  conclusions  about  corporate  America  are,  almost  by 
definition,  limited  by  his  ethnological  methodology  to  a  particular  set  of 
that impedes managers' capacity to deal with regulatory requirements in the chemical and 
textile industries, see id. at 155-61.
35 Id. at 111.
36 See id. at 108 (IDENTIFYING INSTANCES OF RULES-IN-USE PREVENTING HONESTY WITHIN 
CORPORATE REGIME).
37 As Jackall explains, this sort of thing did not bother his managers at all:
[A]s managers see it, playing sleight of hand with the monetary value of inventories, post- or 
predating memoranda or invoices, tucking or squirreling large sums of money away to pull 
them out of one's hat at an opportune moment are all part and parcel of managing in a large 
corporation where interpretations of performance, not necessarily performance itself, decide 
one's fate.  Furthermore, the whole point of the corporation is precisely to put other people's 
money, rather than one's own resources, at risk.
Id. at 110.
38 A manager, Brady, disturbed by clear evidence of manipulation of the pension fund found 
that:
Key people in the corporation . . . were using about $18 million from the employee pension 
fund as a profit slush fund.  Essentially, there was too much money in the pension fund.  
Explicit rules govern such a contingency but these were being ignored.  The money was not 
declared  as  an  asset  but  concealed  and  moved  in  and  out  of  the  corporation's  earning 
statements each year so that the corporation always came in exactly on target.  In fact, each
October key officials could predict earnings per share for the year to the penny even though 
one-third  of  all  earnings  were  in  foreign  currency.    This  uncanny  accuracy  assured  top 
executives, of course, of completely reliable bonus payments.  These were tied to hitting profit 
targets and gave top managers in the company up to 100 percent of their annual salary in 
deferred income in stock on top of whatever benefits they had accrued in the pension plan.
Id. at 107.
39 When Brady brought this situation to the attention of the chief lawyer in the firm, he " 'did 
not want to touch the issue with a barge pole.' " Id.
40 See id. at 122-23 (citing examples of two in-house lawyers who were kept in dark about two 
instances of substantial illegal behavior by corporate managers, bribery and improper disposal 
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companies  in  two  specific  (and  highly  troubled)  industries  during  one  time 
period, the scale and breadth of the recent corporate scandals suggests that the 
dynamic  he  describes,  or  something  like  it,  was  widespread  in  corporate 
America in the years since Moral Mazes was published in 1988.  The highly 
particularized, socially-conditioned moral world he analyzes so minutely may 
indeed be a large part of our world.
B.  Are Lawyers in the Moral Maze?
But  even  if  Jackall's  description  of  the  moral  rules-in-use  of  corporate 
managers  is  broadly  applicable  to  today's  Enrons,  WorldComs  and 
HealthSouths,  what  does  that  have  to  do  with  lawyers?    While  corporate 
managers may have been caught in a moral maze created by the patterns of 
power and uncertainty in bureaucratic organizations, can it be said that their 
lawyers were caught in a similar maze, causing them to join their clients in 
sidelining the moral considerations they knew to exist and professed to respect?  
A  full  answer  to  that  question  would  demand  a  study  of  lawyers'  lives  as 
intensive as Jackall's journey into his managers' lives, but some conclusions can 
be ventured, first about in-house counsel, and then about outside attorneys.
In-house  counsel  are  in  precisely  the  same  maze  as  their  managerial 
colleagues.  They are vulnerable to adopting the same occupational morality as 
the managers with whom they work, because they are subject to the same social 
exigencies, power struggles, personal uncertainties and demands of expediency 
that characterize the corporate bureaucratic organization.
41  Theoretically, in-
house counsel's role—to protect clients from themselves—and their own sense 
of themselves as independent professionals should make them less vulnerable.  
They should, after all, be expected to function as a check against any tendency 
to view law compliance cynically and truth contingently.
42  It can be assumed 
that many in-house counsel do in fact play that role.  In fact, their closeness to 
their managerial clients can produce a trust in their judgment that allows them 
to  question  and  challenge  their  clients'  decisions  very  effectively.
43    That 
closeness, however, is double-edged.  Counsel's constant exposure to the moral 
rules-in-use that govern day-to-day life in the corporation may produce in some 
an  ethical  numbing  that  erodes  their  ability  to  function  in  that  vital  quasi-
adversarial manner.
41 See id. at 108 (describing case of responsibility-dodging chief lawyer) .
42 In an excellent study based on intensive fieldwork in a corporate legal department, Michael 
J. Kelly shows that corporate managers can internalize this role understanding. In MICHAEL J. 
KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 107 (1994), a 
manager describes his relationship with in-house counsel in these terms: "A lawyer should 
seek to restrain you.  It is my lawyer's professional duty to argue with me."  Id.
43 See id. at 85-115 (describing how that trust relationship was developed in company that 
author  studied).  "There is less distrust, because the lawyers and client are literally on the 
same team."  Id. at 90.  Kelly's in-house lawyers "have a connection of trust with the client 
[i.e., the company] that enables the client to accept what he or she may not want to hear, 
without misunderstanding or hard feelings." Id. at 91.3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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As a result, corporate counsel may develop tendencies that reflect, rather 
than challenge the organizational morality, including: (i) a tendency to avoid 
characterizing questionable activities as involving "legality" or "illegality," let 
alone  "right"  or  "wrong,"  so  that  they  may  be  defined  as  mere  practical 
"problems" to be "managed" as quietly as possible; (ii) a tendency to provide 
ambiguous, tentative advice that enables managers to continue operating on the 
margins of legality;
44 (iii) a tendency to acquiesce in silencing whistle-blowers, 
including other lawyers and, most important;
45 (iv) a tendency by senior counsel 
to identify too closely with the personal interests and fates of the CEO or other 
senior  managers.
46    Ironically,  lawyers'  self-conception  as  advocates  for  the 
client, as neutral, non-judgmental facilitators of transactions, or as professionals 
trained to make "arguments" on either side of an issue, can allow a high degree 
of rationalization of their complicity in conduct that is ultimately not in their 
corporate client's interest, certainly not in the public interest and often immoral 
if not illegal.  Lawyers in large corporations, thus, may adapt to the bureaucratic 
organization by developing the same moral consciousness as their managerial 
colleagues, and become trapped in the moral maze out of which they should be 
guiding their clients.  While many avoid that trap, some do not.
Outside attorneys, in contrast, do not occupy the same moral universe as 
the managers of their corporate clients, because they are socialized in different 
organizational settings.  Jackall's analysis of the moral rules-in-use of corporate 
managers thus might not seem terribly relevant to explaining the behavior of 
outside attorneys.  Closer consideration, however, suggests that the analysis is 
in fact quite relevant, at least as a way of defining a threat to lawyers' integrity.
It  is  relevant,  first  of  all,  because  of  the  possibility  that  lawyers  will 
assimilate their clients' world-view.  Donald Langevoort has demonstrated how 
cognitive psychology explains this phenomenon, and, in particular, how it can 
lead to attorney complicity in client fraud.
47  Lawyers may develop perceptual 
schema based on first impressions of a client's probity that create a presumption 
of trustworthiness that is hard to overcome.
48  Adoption of the client's world-
44  See,  e.g.,  Crampton,  supra  note  7,  at  158-62  (describing  advice  provided  by  Arthur 
Andersen's in-house counsel regarding document destruction).
45 See JACKALL, supra note 13, at 108.  In-house lawyers may learn to acquiesce because they 
may be at best ignored or at worst terminated if they attempt to draw attention to illegal or 
otherwise questionable behavior by managers.  See id. (discussing case of corporate cousel 
facing pressure due to discovery of financial fraud).  See also Sargent, supra note 3, at 38 
n.109 (describing fate of would-be whistle-blowing in-house lawyers at Enron).
46 See Sargent, supra note 3, at 38 n.108 (noting similarities with general counsels of both 
Tyco and Enron).
47 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' 
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 95-110 (1993).
48 See id at 102-03 (noting that cognitive limitations may also prevent lawyers from perceiving 
and acting upon information inconsistent with their presumption of client's probity, because 
such recognition would be threatening to lawyers' self-conception).  Lanngevoort states:
When  people  voluntarily  commit  themselves  to  a  certain  position,  attitude  or  belief,  the 
subsequent discovery of information that indicates harmful consequences flowing from that 
commitment  directly  threatens  their  self-concept  as  good,  worthwhile  individuals.    Thus, 
cognition processes will work to suppress such information if at all possible.
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view provides a heuristic that allows an outsider to map and interpret novel and 
uncertain  social arrangements.   Assent, or apparent assent to clients' values, 
goals  and  modus  operandi  appeals  to  lawyers'  instinct  to  share  in  a  group 
modality that rewards cooperative behavior.  Langevort thus identifies cognitive 
mechanisms that lead attorneys to the client's world-view; Jackall enriches our 
understanding by telling us something disquieting about what that world-view 
might  be,  and  how  it  encourages  both  active  and  passive  involvement  in 
managerial illegality and immorality of the type just described.  Once lawyers 
start to think like their clients, they may start to act like their clients.  In this 
view,  lawyer  complicity  is  not  a  simple  matter  of  personal  greed  or  supine 
acquiescence to client greed; it is a defect of cognition and, as such, perhaps 
more dangerous.
49
Jackall's analysis is also relevant, however, because large law firms, like 
Jackall's chemical companies, are bureaucratic organizations.  They are social 
structures  that  may  develop  moral  rules-in-use  not  dissimilar  from  those 
operating in those corporations, and that may lead to the kind of bracketing of 
moral restraints characteristic of the corporate moral consciousness.  I cannot, 
of course, state categorically that they are the same, without the type of rich 
information Jackall used in reading his conclusions.  Conclusions derived from 
detailed  fieldwork  in  specific  types  of  organizations  should  certainly  not  be 
generalized glibly to other types of organizations.  While large law firms are 
social bureaucracies in Jackall's terms, they are not the same societies as large 
business corporations.  It is also dangerous to generalize about an entire sector 
of the legal profession.
Comparison of the moral consciousness of lawyers to that of managers, 
furthermore,  must  take  into  account  the  different  types  of  moral  formation 
provided by lawyers' professional education and training and the sense of public 
trust implicit in their professional self-conception.  Indeed, many lawyers attach 
tremendous value to their self-conception as counselors against fraud and self-
dealing.    It  is  their  raison  d'etre  or  stock-in-trade.    Violation  of  that  self-
conception  through  even  passive  complicity  in  wrongdoing  may  produce 
intolerable role-strain in such lawyers.  The collegial, participatory manner of 
go v ernance  in  at  least  some  partnership  structures  also  may  be  a  bulwark 
against the shell games with truth endemic to more hierarchical organizations.  
Lawyers  in  large  law  firms  thus  may  be  more  resistant  to  the  pressure  that 
emerges  within  corporate  bureaucracies  to  develop  a  stunted  moral 
consciousness.
But are they immune?  I believe we need to look closely at whether the 
49 Indeed, as Professor David Luban has pointed out, most of the lawyers involved in some of 
the worst cases of complicity probably do not believe they did anything wrong.
One  of  the  investigators  for  the  Powers  Report  recalls  that  when  Enron's  lawyers  were 
explaining the details of the elaborate "special purpose entity" deals that siphoned millions of 
dollars into  Andrew  Fastow's  pockets,  they  weren't  ashamed  or  embarrassed.    They  were 
proud of their handiwork, and eager to explain how they did it.
David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, June 24, 2003, at 2 (copy on file with 
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correlation of status in at least some large law firms with client generation and 
retention, the moral hazards created by an "eat what you kill" method of partner 
compensation,
50 the consequent fluidity and instability of personal status, the 
use of internal competition as an organizing principle in what Marc Galanter 
and Thomas Pallay famously called the "tournament of lawyers,"
51 the system
of personal patronage, fealty and loyalty among individuals within the firm, and 
the tendency to regard "truth" as socially-defined and contingent common to all 
bureaucracies, tend to produce the kind of moral rules-in-use that can lead to 
complicity in the face of client wrongdoing.  In particular, the need to please 
clients in order to keep them in a highly competitive market for legal services 
suggests that the positive forces supporting lawyer independence too often will 
not be strong enough to counter the drift toward complicity.  The sociological 
theory may need to be worked out, but the record of complicity described above 
suggests that in too many cases the social dynamic of the law firm has produced 
precisely that result not in outlier firms, but at the heart of the elite corporate 
bar.
A WAY OUT OF THE MAZE?
What, then, is likely to be the fate of the Standards?  Do they offer a way 
out of the maze? Are they likely to be an intervention that short circuits the 
patterns of complicity by creating a legal obligation preventing lawyers from 
50  The  dependence  of  partners  on  unstable  client  relationships  may  produce  an  ethical 
numbing for obvious reasons:
Compensation  based  on  business  generation  means  that  partners  are  more  vulnerable  to 
shifting market conditions . . . A partner subject to the "eat what you kill" system may be 
anxious about where her next meal is coming from.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 931, 937 (2002).  As Professor Bainbridge has pointed out in assessing (critically) the 
potential influence of the Standards:
Because an individual partner is even more likely than a firm to be dependent 
on billings to a single major client, the eat what you kill phenomenon makes it 
highly unlikely that such a partner will risk antagonizing key clients absent the 
proverbial smoking gun (and maybe not even then).
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 18.
51  MARC  GALANTER  &  J.  THOMAS  PALAY,  TOURNAMENT  OF  LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77-120 (1991).  Galanter and Pallay describe the 
promotion-to-partner tournament as a mechanism for recovering the human-specific cost of 
investment  in  associates  by  binding  them  to  the  firm  through  offering  them  the  prize  of 
partnership for winning the competitive tournament, and preventing them from shirking by 
posing the threat of losing the tournament.  While the adequacy of the economic tournament 
model for explaining the organization of law firms was questioned in David B. Wilkins & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information 
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1586-87 
(1998), even they conceded that it was a useful metaphor, particularly with respect to senior 
associates in their last few years of partnership.  Id. at 1633.  Accord Bainbridge, supra note 2, 
at 12-15.  The winners of such tournaments, furthermore, may be characterized by an "ethical 
plasticity," allowing wide scope for construing self-serving behavior as reasonable, "so that 
moral anxiety is buffered."  Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
968, 970 (2002).3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
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doing the kinds of things their socially-determined rules-in-use would incline 
them to do?  Before answering that question, however, it must be emphasized 
that the Standards are actually quite modest as an attempt to solve the problem 
of  lawyer  complicity  in  client  wrongdoing.    They  do  not  really  attempt  to 
address the case of lawyers who actively and intentionally participate in and 
benefit  from  client  wrongdoing  either  as  primary  violators  or  aiders  and 
abettors.  Lawyers who are willing to do that sort of thing are not likely to 
worry much about violating the up-the-ladder reporting requirement or even a 
noisy withdrawal requirement.  Furthermore, because the Standards, as of this 
writing, do not include a noisy withdrawal/reporting-out requirement, they do 
not address the problem of what lawyers should do when senior managers are 
complicit with or indifferent to the wrongs they have detected.  The Standards 
simply address the problem  of passive complicity, of remaining silent  when 
confronted with evidence of managerial law violations, when reporting up the 
ladder  to  senior  managers  or  the  board  conceivably  could  have  made  a 
difference
That  problem,  however,  is  important.    One  of  the  core  rules-in-use 
described above is the imperative to remain silent in those circumstances.  To 
the extent that the Standards counter that imperative, they will be very useful 
and should be welcomed.  What needs to be considered, however, is whether 
the same social conditions that have resulted in lawyers' silence about some 
serious  law  violations  will  also  promote  rationalization,  evasion  and  willful 
blindness with respect to the Standards' requirements.  That risk is substantial, 
particularly if the criteria that triggers the reporting requirement provides, as 
seems likely, wide discretion for prospective determination by the attorney that 
reporting is not required,
52 or retrospective determination by a court that it was 
not required.  Furthermore, if the SEC, as Michael Perino has argued, is neither 
interested  in  nor  capable  of  enforcing  the  requirement  vigorously,
53  the 
prevailing rules-in-use will allow it to slide into irrelevance as legal arguments 
for rationalizing non-reporting, routinized, in-firm bureaucratic mechanisms for 
processing the reporting decision become fixed, and firms learn to avoid the 
kind of situations in which the reporting decision might have to be confronted.
54
The mere existence of the rules may have a deterrent effect on many cautious 
and conscientious lawyers, but if the kinds of firms that actively or passively 
contributed  to  the  egregious  behavior  of  corporate  clients  such  as  Enron, 
WorldCom and so many others are dominated by a moral consciousness that 
encourages  endless  rationalization  and  willful  blindness,  then  the  deterrent 
effect is likely to be minimal.
55  A full understanding of the social dynamics that 
52[CITE CRAMTON KONIAK COHEN ARTICLE]
53[CITE PERINO ARTICLE]
54 In addition, if lawyers were to take the reporting-up requirement seriously, clients may be 
less willing to share information with their lawyers if they feel that their lawyers will blow the 
whistle on them within the corporate hierarchy.  For discussion of this possibility, see Fisch & 
Rosen, supra note 2, at 1128.  The net effect may be removal of lawyers from situations in 
which they conceivably could have a positive influence on corporate decision-making.  See
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 15-16.
55 For a similarly pessimistic assessment of the potential influence of the Standards, also based 3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
2004] LAWYERS IN THE MORAL MAZE 117
generated  the  need  for  the  Standards  in  the  first  place  may  lead  to  the 
conclusion that reliance on the ability of those caught in a moral maze to choose 
to recognize and act upon wrongdoing may be overly optimistic.
56
The social imperatives militate against development of a consciousness in 
which  such  self-policing  is  possible.  Defects  in  cognition,  alertness  to 
expediency  and,  most  of  all,  the  bracketing  of  moral  concern  are  all  too 
characteristic of the bureaucratic organizations in which lawyers operate and 
which they represent.  Perhaps only a more stringent liability regime under the 
securities laws, including revived aiding and abetting liability and a broader 
scope for primary liability,
57 will make a real difference in leading lawyers out 
of the maze.
on assessment of the organizational dynamics of the large law firm, see Bainbridge, supra note 
2, at 17-19. ("[D]espite the attorney's overarching legal obligations to report misconduct, the 
attitudes ingrained by the promotion-to-partner tournament will incline them to intentionally 
or subconsciously overlook evidence of management misconduct").
56 I leave it to others to discuss whether the Standards' reporting-up requirement (or any future 
noisy  withdrawal  reporting-out  requirement)  is  inconsistent  with  the  lawyer's  primary 
obligation to the client.  In other words, to what extent is there a tension between one lawyer's 
responsibilities as gatekeeper and responsibilities as a counselor in business transactions?  For 
an analysis of that tension and criticism of the Standards from practitioners' perspectives, see 
Stanley  Keller  &  Peter  Moser,  __  VILL.  L.  REV.  __,  (2004).    As  has  been  emphasized 
elsewhere, the reporting-up requirement actually supports the lawyer's obligation to the real 
client (the corporation) as distinct from the managers who hired her.  See Cramton, supra note 
__, at 154-56.  While that is true, the federalization of the reporting-up requirement, with the 
at least theoretical risk of SEC enforcement, alters the tone of the lawyer-client relationship 
and may impede the development of trust.  The question, then, is whether the benefits to be 
derived  from  the  Standards  outweigh  the  resulting  cost:  a  tendency  to  exclude  well-
intentioned lawyers from the kinds of deliberations where they could exercise a restraining 
influence.
57 For a useful discussion of how such expanded liability may arise from the litigation against 
the law firms involved in the Enron debacle, see Daniel A. Ninivaggi, Stephen J. Senderowitz 
and James J. Cotter, 91 ILL. B.J.350 (July 2003).